The idea didn’t originate with Henry George

You’d think an ideology named after a particular person would have originated with that person, which would mean that Georgism must have originated with Henry George, right? But that’s not really the case, which is something many Georgists are quick to point out – Henry George himself included. George saw himself as carrying on the same tradition as the French physiocrats, as well as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, etc., all of whom had made arguments similar to George’s about rent and landlords. Perhaps you could claim that George took their arguments further and radicalized them, but even that had arguably been done before George by people like Thomas Spence and Patrick Edward Dove.

Compare it to Marxism. Marx developed a socio-political theory about class struggle, the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie, dialectical materialism, a specific critique of capitalism, and many more ideas that we now associate with Marxism. Not every single idea was unique to Marx, but that particular bundle of ideas certainly was. So in that regard, it makes sense to call it Marxist, because it is of Marx, so to speak. This just isn’t true when it comes to Georgism.

Georgism isn’t (and ought not be) a cult of personality

I mean, I get it – Henry George was pretty great. His writing isn’t just intellectually persuasive; it’s also incredibly inspiring and surprisingly accessible for something written 150 years ago. And from what I’ve read about him, he seemed to be a really impressive person. But he most certainly wasn’t infallible, and society and the economy have evolved a lot since his time. He is not the be-all and end-all of the Georgist movement, nor should we want him to be. If we end up having to interpret what George said in different contexts, we’re on the wrong track.

This is one of the reasons I’m generally not in favor of naming ideologies after their originators. As such, I much prefer liberalism or socialism to Marxism, Maoism, or Leninism – not to mention that the latter ideologies also (fittingly) tend much more toward cults of personality. Even “Trumpism” has that quality now. We’ve fallen into the same trap of tying our ideology to a specific person, which makes us seem more sycophantic than we really are. Georgism isn’t a personality cult, but the name can make it seem like one.

Honestly, it kind of sounds bad

The first two issues aside, the name itself just doesn’t sound great, if I’m being honest. Unlike Marxism, which at least has a certain ring to it – since “Marx” isn’t a common name in English – Georgism sounds awkward because George is such a plain name. But as I’m not a native English speaker, I’ll focus on the word in Swedish, where it’s honestly a real problem.

First of all, it’s unclear how it’s even supposed to be pronounced naturally in Swedish. Is it “George” in English plus “-ism” in Swedish, or should we try to Swedish-ify “George” as well? Neither option sounds good, and most of the people I’ve talked to about Georgism in Swedish have had a hard time saying it. They either told me so explicitly or avoided saying the word altogether, stumbling over it when they did attempt it. I realize that the way things sound is somewhat subjective, but I’m telling you: it just doesn’t work in Swedish. It’s clunky, awkward, and ugly.

So where does that leave us? If you’ve read my previous posts, you know I’ve been using “Georgism” single-handedly. How come, if I dislike it so much? Well, mainly because everyone else uses it. Even in Sweden, the term “Georgism” has been the go-to word from the start, and all the material I’ve read in Swedish from the early 20th century has used the word. (One wonders how it was pronounced by Swedes back then.) When I started speaking and writing about it, I made a conscious decision to use “Georgism” because I figured that was the accepted term. However, I realize there are a few contenders:

Geoism: This is the obvious main alternative, and the fact that it’s phonetically so close to Georgism also makes the switch easier. It’s favored by several Georgists, like my compatriot Martin Jacobson, explicitly because it uncouples the ideology from Henry George and makes it a broader movement. However, it certainly has issues, probably the main one being that – once again – it just doesn’t sound that great. It sounds like it has something to do with geology. Also, the modern-day ideology isn’t narrowly focused on land. “Geoism” could make it seem like it’s all about “the ground” in a very strict sense.

Physiocracy: meaning “rule of nature.” This was originally the name of an economic theory developed by a group of 18th-century French Enlightenment economists, but the term could certainly be revived. However, I think the name sounds like it’s positioning itself as an alternative to democracy, which is a bad look. It also sounds a bit hoity-toity (as is to be expected from a French term, I suppose!).

Cooperative individualism: Honestly, this is a term I quite like, but I don’t think it’s a serious contender because of what a mouthful it is. It’s simply too long and complicated. Also, the term “individualism” leaves a bad taste in many people’s mouths, enough that it’s probably not a good way to brand the movement. There’s probably more of an argument to be made that cooperative individualism should be seen as a synonym for left-libertarianism.

So I’m left using the term “Georgism” for the time being. But I really wish there were an alternative. So I’m asking you, fellow reader: what do you think? Do you like the term “Georgism,” or do you have a better suggestion in mind?

I’m all ears.

Protection or Free Trade
Henry George (1886)
As the title suggests, this book focuses on arguing against protectionism and tariffs, and for free trade. But just like in Progress and Poverty, George also ties it into the broader Georgist framework of taxing land instead of labour. If you’ve read Progress and Poverty and want more George, or if you’re interested in free trade, this book is for you. I listened to a free (AI-read) audio version.

The Theory of Human Progression
Patrick Edward Dove (1850)
Another proto-Georgist, as Dove basically argues for the same policy as George (tax land, not labor). However, most of the book is spent on other issues, such as defining political science. It gets quite technical (and philosophical), which I usually like, but in this case I found it a bit tedious, and I ended up not reading all of it. I’d only recommend this if you’re really into 19th-century philosophy.

The Price of Inequality
Joseph Stiglitz (2012)
Stiglitz is a Keynesian and therefore not strictly a Georgist, but his proposed remedy for the problems of the American economy, with its growing inequality, is still highly relevant from a Georgist perspective, as he identifies rent-seeking as the main political and economic issue: “Rents are the source of so much of today’s inequality.”, he writes. This book is mostly focused on the US, and I’d especially recommend it to Americans, but it’s still an instructive read for everyone.

A Philosopher’s Take on Economics
John Tippett (2012)
This is more or less an introduction to (geo-)economics from first principles without much jargon, and as it features very few tables and calculations it’s very accessible. There are some good bits in it, and it’s also quite short. However, the way it’s written makes it seem less rigorous and more one-sided than a typical book on (analytic) philosophy, and at times it reads more like a political manifesto. Tippett also has a tendency to invoke God, which leaves a bit of a poor aftertaste in my atheist mouth. Also, unlike most Georgists, he’s also skeptical of economic interest.

The Land Question
Henry George (1881)
Originally titled The Irish Land Question, as George begins with the problems ailing the Irish people. He then proceeds to explain how the Irish problem (namely, that the Irish people do not own their own land) is actually a universal issue. This is a fairly short book that can be finished in a day or two, and it’s pretty great. This is my new go-to recommendation for people who want to learn about Georgism straight from Henry George, but don’t feel like taking on the task of reading through Progress and Poverty just yet. I listened to a free (AI-read) audio version.

The Commons in an Age of Uncertainty – Decolonizing Nature, Economy, and Society
Franklin Obeng-Odoom (2020)
Obeng-Odoom explores how “the commons” – i.e., shared resources like land, housing, and public goods – are managed in a world shaped by inequality and economic instability. He argues for rethinking ownership and governance systems to better protect the commons and promote fairness, as well as for the liberation and decolonization of the Global South. His proposals reference Henry George explicitly, and it’s interesting to see George “radicalized” further in a decolonial direction (which is something I know very little about, I might add). However, this is pretty much the opposite of Tippett’s book: it seems quite well argued and rigorous, but as a result it’s also quite jargon-heavy and dense.

Right and Wrong (Vad är rättfärdighet?)
Severin Christensen (1902)
Christensen might be one of my new favorite (forgotten) philosophers, and he deserves more recognition in the broader history of left-libertarian thought. Christensen was a Danish physician, philosopher, and Georgist with a Kantian bent, who founded the Danish party Retsforbundet, which is still active to this day. Right and Wrong is about what Christensen sees as a proper justification of justice as it pertains both to ethics and politics. He argues for what he calls “the compensation principle” (“vederlagsprincipen”) as a foundation for justice – i.e., it’s all about “what we owe each other” morally and politically (therefore he’s also quite similar to T. M. Scanlon). Because land values are created socially, justice demands that the landowner pay it back to society. This is a short, highly readable book, and I look forward to reading more of Christensen’s work. It can be read in full, in English, here.

Följande text skrevs av den svenska georgisten, förläggaren och grundaren av förlaget Natur & Kultur, Johan Hansson, för Ekonomiska frihetsförbundets medlemstidning Budkaveln (1911), som ett öppet brev till den konservativa politikern och historiker Karl Hildebrand. Hildebrand var även chefsredaktör för Stockholms Dagblad, och var, som det framgår av texten nedan, kritisk till Johan Hanssons arbete med jordreform. Jag tycker Hanssons text förtjänar att publiceras och läsas på nytt, då hans resonemang om äganderätt fortfarande är i högsta grad relevant i vår tid – och hans sätt att argumentera är uppfriskande tydligt. Jag har justerat texten något och moderniserat språket, men för den som vill läsa originalet finns en PDF här.

I mitt arbete för jordvärdereform söker jag påverka alla oavsett partiställning och även er, herr Doktor. Jag kan göra det, eftersom jag följer grundsatser, som enligt min uppfattning har en fullt allmängiltig natur, eftersom jag tror på möjligheten av en strävan, fri från klassintressen och särintressen över huvud taget.

Trots detta har ni inte tvekat att upprepade gånger genom er tidning göra gällande att jag genom mitt arbete kränker äganderätten, att jag syftar på konfiskation, att jag våldför mig på rättsprincipen. Och ni har i ert svar på min senaste replik i St. D. för 10 okt. tydligt antytt, att jag på grund av det ej kan göra krav på vanlig respekt, att jag får finna mig i att bli föremål för »en smula hårdhänt eller skämtsam kritik«. Ni har alldeles rätt i detta. Predikar jag konfiskation, bryter jag mot rättsprincipen, då är jag förtjänt av hård behandling av det »fria« ordets män.

Men om det nu skulle förhålla sig så, att det ej är jag utan ni som kränker äganderätten, att det ej är jag utan ni som tolererar och även predikar konfiskation, att det ej är jag utan ni som våldför er på rättsprincipen, då är det klart, att samma öde drabbar er.

Jag har förut under polemik med er berört vad rättvisa, den moraliska rättsprincipen, innebär. Jag har sagt, i överensstämmelse med en framstående specialist på rättsmoralens område (dr Severin Christensen), att rättvisa går ut på ett avvägande av tjänster och gentjänster, så att hänsyn tages till ett fullt likvärdigt vederlag. Denna framställning av rättsprincipens innebörd har ni ännu ej bestritt, lika lite som ni vad jag vet, trots uppmaning, förklarat vad ni själv lägger i ordet rättvisa, när ni använder detsamma. Jag går emellertid, tills jag blir bättre underrättad, ut ifrån att ni godkänner den definition av ordet rättvisa, som nu använts. Jag skulle också gärna vilja tro att ni erkänner att alla statens medborgare och inte endast några få har rätt till rättvisa.

Nåväl, bortser vi från av enskilda å jord nedlagt arbete, kan jag ej betala till enskilda tillfälliga jordägare för rätten att bo och arbeta på själva jorden, utan att den ekvivalenta vederlagsprincipen kränkes. Tomtägaren i Stockholm t. ex., till vilken jag årligen betalar en stor avgift för rätten att bo i huvudstaden, gör mig ej tjänster motsvarande avgiftens värde. Den moraliska rätten att bo på tomten kan han inte ge mig. Den har jag ju redan förut. Tomtägaren har ej mera rätt till tomten än jag. Han har lika litet producerat den som jag. Och utöver ens egna arbetsprodukter eller frivillig gåva av andras arbetsprodukter kan ens verkliga (uteslutande) rätt inte sträcka sig. När jag sålunda betalar tomthyra till enskilda för annat än deras arbetsprodukter, kränkes faktiskt äganderätten. Jag avtvingas en del av vad som är mitt eget, utan att från vederbörande därför erhålla vederlag. Det hjälper inte, att man köpt och betalt för rätten att uppta tomthyra av mig och andra, ty det innebär, att man köpt en rätt att konfiskera mig, och sådan rätt saknar all moralisk sanktion, sådant köp är ej moraliskt bindande.

Helt annorlunda ställer saken sig, när man betraktar mitt förhållande till Stockholms kommun och samhälle. Samhällets växt och gemensamma strävanden, stadens arbete och omsorg om samhällets bästa ge det stycke mark, som Stockholm lever, sitt värde. Jag har förmånen av att bo i en stad med goda gator, god belysning, god renhållning, ett väl organiserat ordningsväsende, högt utvecklade skolor etc. För de förmåner jag sålunda åtnjuter är jag skyldig lämna vederlag. Det sker också. Förmånerna i fråga får med en naturlags nödvändighet uttryck i tomtvärdena. Det är en allmänt känd och erkänd sak, att tomtvärdena stiger och faller med intensiteten i samhällets verksamhet och det allmännas arbete. Lika lite som den enskilde tillfällige tomtägaren har moralisk rätt att uppbära tomthyra av mig, lika fullkomlig rätt har det allmänna till sådan avgift.

Nåväl, vår strävan går just ut på att överflytta rätten till tomthyra dit den hör: det allmänna. Är detta kränkning av äganderätten? Det är inte ens kränkning av den juridiska äganderätten. Ni torde inte kunna påvisa en bokstav i svensk lag, som förbjuder en sådan strävan. Och den moraliska äganderätten, den enda vilken man är skyldig obetingad respekt, uppfylles, i stället för att kränkas genom denna åtgärd. Om äganderätt innebär rätt till sitt eget – och om detta är väl alla ense – så kräver äganderätten jordränterättens överflyttande på det allmänna såsom representant för samhället, för oss alla gemensamt. Och den som sätter sig emot dessa strävanden, den som försvarar det nuvarande tillståndet, han är den sanna äganderättens fiende.

Ni talar om konfiskation. Har ni då någonsin gjort klart för er, vad konfiskation innebär? En framstående brittisk minister yttrade i ett föredrag, som jag hade tillfälle höra, på tal om jordreform, att vad de brittiska framstegsvännerna eftersträvade var inte konfiskation, utan ändrandet av lagar som hade konfiskatoriska verkningar. Han träffade huvudet på spiken. Ekonomiska frihetsförbundet syftar på detsamma. Vi vill inte konfiskation. Vi vill upphäva den konfiskation som dagligen förekommer ibland oss. Detta gäller inte blott enskildas omoraliska rätt att uppta tomthyra. Det gäller även statens beskattning i åtskilliga avseenden. Mina skyldigheter mot det allmänna står aldrig och kan aldrig komma att stå i något samband med den mängd varor jag behagar importera från utlandet. När vissa procentskatt pålägges mig i förhållande till denna import, så blir jag rätt och slätt konfiskerad i den utsträckning skatten utgår. Ett sådant förfarande finner ni försvarligt. Det har ni vad jag vet aldrig sagt ett ord emot i er tidningsspalter, och ändå gör ni anspråk på att betraktas som äganderättens väktare. Jag åtnjuter visserligen förmåner av staten, men dessa förmåner får jag betala för, när jag betalar för rätten att bo och arbeta på svensk jord.

Fullt så svår, om inte ännu värre, är den brandskattning jag är föremål för genom det privata tullskyddet. Var gång jag köper socker, plundras jag med den höga sockertullens belopp, om inte mer, ty varken sockerindustrin eller staten ger mig vederlag för denna påtvungna utgift utöver varans värde på världsmarknaden. Även denna form av konfiskation anser ni er kunna försvara. Trots att ni likaväl som jag måste förstå, att tullskydd innebär överflyttandet av somliga medborgares egendom över i andras fickor utan vederlag, kan ni inte blott blunda därför, utan rent av önska denna trafik utvidgad, medan ni på allt sätt misstänkliggör dem, som på dessa vitala områden eftersträva rättvisa.

Ni tänker endast på de ägarnas rätt, ni tyckes se er livsuppgift i att bevara privilegierna åt dem, som en gång fått dem. För huvudmassan av samhällets medlemmar, de som får betala, de som plundras snart sagt från vaggan till graven, de som födes för att lida, de som ej få tillfälle till självförsörjning, till självutveckling, eftersom de naturliga och de sociala möjligheterna härför är mer eller mindre monopoliserade – för dem känner ni ingen rätt. Dock ha dessa samma rätt som de andra. Statens egentliga uppgift är att öva rättvisa, har en känd amerikansk universitetsrektor, dr Starr Jordan, yttrat; i den mån den försummar detta, är den helt enkelt korrumperad. Sanningen i detta bör även ni kunna se, men ni föredrar korruption framför en ärlig strävan mot rättvisa i staten.

Misstag er inte om våra syften. Vi är inte blinda för att även jordägarna, inteckningsägarna och de tullskyddade industriidkarna ha rätt till rättvisa, men de mångfaldigt talrikare medborgare, som, i stället för att profitera, förlora och lida under den nuvarande ekonomiska samhällsordningen – de ha just samma rätt till rättvisa. Här brytas sålunda moraliska krav. Uppenbart är emellertid, att massan av orättvist behandlade samhällsmedlemmar ha en större rätt att bli fritagna från enskild och offentlig plundring än de privilegierade har att få behålla de företrädesrättigheter de, tack vare en ofullkomlig samhällslagstiftning, vetat förvärva sig. Vår strävan att undanröja privilegierna och främja lika rätt åt alla är så mycket mera tilltalande som den innebär en gradvis försiggående, målmedveten process, en gradvis minskning av den konfiskatoriska beskattning som staten tillåter sig själv och de tullskyddade att utöva, och en gradvis överflyttning på det allmännas hand av de jordvärden som samhället som sådant är upphov till. Ingen enda jordränteinnehavare behöver bli ruinerad eller utfattig härav. Den stora massan av jordägare i vårt land kommer tvärtom att vinna därpå av det enkla skälet att den konfiskation, de själva är föremål för, mer än uppväger den konfiskation, som de i sin tur kunna utöva genom sin jordräntebesittning. De komma tillika, att i förening med alla andra samhällsmedlemmar bli delaktiga i det allmänna ekonomiska och sociala uppsving som måste bli följden, när all värdefull jord tvungits över i goda brukares händer.

Tänker ni på detta å ena sidan och tänker ni på å andra sidan, hur mycket slöseri med andlig och fysisk kraft, hur mycket lidande, som är följden av det nuvarande tillståndet, så inser ni, på vilken sida moralen är. Är ni en etiskt bildad man, så inser ni, att rättvisan är på vår och inte på er sida. Är ni en ärlig man, så erkänner ni detta öppet. Är ni en modig man, så ställer ni er i våra led!

Den svenska organiserade högern har ännu ej tagit ställning till den sak, vi representera och ni så ivrigt bekämpar. Jag vill ännu ej tro, att ni ger uttryck för hela högerns uppfattning. Men är detta fall, då måste högern betraktas som den sanna äganderättens värsta fiende i vårt land, som konfiskationens och de samhälliga orättvisornas mäktigaste bundsförvant. Då har den ock förverkat respekt från alla för social rättvisa engagerade medborgares sida, då har den intagit en position i den sociala striden, i vilken den är dömd till upplösning och nederlag.

— Johan Hansson, 1911

“Job Rebuked by His Friends”, William Blake, 1757–1827

Note: this is an older essay, previously published on my Tumblr in October 3, 2022.

Introduction

The apparent conflict between an all loving God and evil is a problem that’s plagued theologians and philosophers all through the ages. If God exists and is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent, how can evil exist in the world?

According to the Swedish theologian, author and Christian apologist Micael Grenholm in his essay The Problem of Evil – a challenge both for theism as well as naturalism1, the problem of evil is not just an issue for the theist, but for the atheist as well. In his essay he defends two contentions: A) evil may be compatible with the existence of God, and B) The existence of evil presents a meta-ethical problem pertaining to the grounding of moral judgments, that can’t be answered successfully without reference to God.

The first claim is very modest – Micael has in debates elsewhere been much more forthright in his defense of God’s compatibility with evil, and I assume his humble assertion in the essay is done to limit the scope of the text – rather than him not feeling like his arguments are up to the challenge. He concludes that

…there appears to be no feasible way for the naturalist to justify the existence of objective evil, and without this I do not think he can use the problem of evil as an argument against the existence of God. This does not mean that the problem of evil as a challenge to theism is resolved, but it throws a wrench into the works of those who believe that the existence of evil without question makes naturalism more credible than theism.

So, according to Micael, while the theist indeed does have a challenge in the problem of evil that needs to be addressed, the issue is even deeper – and seemingly more unanswerable – for the atheist. In this essay I aim to mainly analyze and critique Micael’s second contention and subsequent conclusion, but I will start by saying something about the first.

Theodicies

An argument that aims to show that God’s existence is compatible with evil and/or suffering is called a theodicy (from the French Théodicée, meaning vindication of God), and many theodicies have been proposed and defended throughout history by theologians. Micael starts by suggesting two possible theodicies: 1. The existence of free will explains why there is moral evil in the world (a variant of an Augustinian theodicy), and 2. We live in a fallen world and thus we should expect there to be evil (a biblical theodicy). He swiftly – and rightly – concludes that the first theodicy fails to account for natural evil,2 and is therefore at best only partly successful, and that the second is incompatible with a scientific world view and evolutionary biology (in so far as it postulates a biblical account of humanity’s origin).

Micael then goes on to suggest two further strategies that can be employed by the theist when discussing the problem of evil, with the first one being so called skeptical theism. He classifies skeptical theism as a different type of argument than typical theodicies, but when considered as a response to why God would allow gratuitous evil it might as well be classified as yet another theodicy. Irrespective of how we classify it, the idea of skeptical theism is basically the adage of “God works in mysterious ways”: in our limited knowledge as fallible humans, we are not in a position to judge or even understand the mind and working of God, so we can never know that He lacks sufficient reasons to allow the evil in the world. When considered as a theodicy I think this is one of – if not the – strongest arguments against all versions of the problem of evil.

However, there are issues with this argument. The shear amount of suffering in the world that has existed for millennia, and still exist today is prima facia evidence against the God of classical theism: if God exists, He’s all-powerful which means He has the ability to construct the best world possible. He’s also all-good and therefore wants the absolute best for all His creatures. Consequently, He wants us to suffer as little as possible, and He has the power to make sure that we do. While He might for various reasons allow suffering that has some greater good attached to it – i.e. a silver-lining – He will never allow gratuitous suffering – evil without any justification. Any suffering that exists in a universe controlled by God thus must have some sort of justification that explains why God is allowing it, and that justification must entail some even greater good that would be forsaken if God didn’t allow that instance of suffering in the first place. The idea that all human and animal suffering – all moral and natural evil – that’s played out for millions of years in His creation is all required for the world to exist and be perfect – is highly implausible and cries out for an explanation. If God is equated with a parent (which He typically is in traditional forms of theism), He seems to be failing in His fatherly duties. If your children suffer and you have the power to ease their suffering, it seems reasonable to assume that you would do so, unless their suffering is required for an even greater good. But even in that case, a parent will do everything to ensure their child that they won’t suffer more than necessary, and reassure them that things will be all right and attempt to comfort them. God’s silence either means He’s a bad parent – or simply absent.

The third strategy Micael employs is the so called “Overrider Response”, from C. Stephen Layman:

…theists may simply admit that the problem of evil is a special difficulty for theism […], nevertheless natural theology and/or religious experience provide adequate reason or warrant for theism.3

The idea with this response is to say that even though evil counts as evidence against the God of classical theism, the vast number of other arguments for such a God still count in favor of belief in that God, on balance. Addressing all other arguments for the existence of God (which, as you know, are legion) would go far beyond the scope of this essay, so I’ll simply hand wave away this argument by saying that no argument I’ve come across so far for the existence of God have been compelling to me. We could change the argument around and say that since there are so many arguments for God’s existence and they all fail, that is in and of itself an argument against the existence of God. Because, if He did exist, surely the time devoted by so many smart people throughout the ages would’ve yielded compelling evidence for his existence. However, this all hinges on whether you think other arguments for the existence of God work or not – if you do think so, you’ll find The Overrider Response compelling, and you’ll be a theist. If you don’t think so, you’ll dismiss The Overrider Response – and you’ll be an atheist.

Micael then turns to Layman’s so called Comparative Response: even though theism may have a difficult time answering the problem of evil, atheism has an even bigger problem. Why? Because evil presupposes suffering, and if suffering is to exist there must be conscious experience. Consciousness presupposes the possibility of life. Evil also presupposes the ability to choose to act immoral, which in turn presupposes free will. All of these (consciousness, biological life and free will) are difficult to account for in an atheistic world view. But his main focus is the meta-ethical issue: if God does not exist, there is no metaphysical grounding of objective moral values, and since objective moral values exist (according to Micael), then so too must God. This is the second contention I mentioned in the beginning, which Micael spends the rest of his text expounding upon.

Meta-ethical quandaries for the atheist

Let’s start by unpacking the objection. Micael thinks there are moral propositions (like “it’s wrong to torture someone to death for no reason”) that are objectively true, but he spends little time arguing for this in his essay. It would be very easy for an atheist reading Micael’s text to simply dismiss his entire argument by appealing to some type of moral anti-realism: the view that there are no objectively true moral propositions. In fact, some of the main positions in meta-ethics would accept that position and thus would have no problem with Micael’s argument: error-theory (there are no true moral propositions), ethical subjectivism (there are no objectively true moral propositions) and various types of non-cognitivism (there are no moral propositions) are all defensible philosophical positions to take in the meta-ethical debate on the anti-realist side (among several others), and Micael spends no time trying to show why they are false.

With that said, I’m tentatively (at least for the sake of this essay) inclined to accept that we can differentiate between true and false moral propositions. My reason for this is mainly linguistic: moral language is expressed as if it contains propositions, and genuine disagreement about these propositions seems to be possible. If I say “It’s wrong to eat meat” and you disagree, the disagreement appears to be about a fact that can either be right or wrong. If both our positions can be true at once (i.e. if there is no genuine disagreement) that requires an explanation that becomes more round-about than simply saying that one of us is right and the other is wrong. Furthermore, the proposition “it’s wrong to eat meat” seemingly isn’t just a psychological state but rather some type of relation between that state and a fact of the external world. (Of course, if you’re an anti-realist, none of what I just said make sense to you.) So, I accept that moral language is prima facia objective, and without a defeater to that position we are justified in holding to it – much like we’re justified in thinking that “1+1=2” is an objective fact about the world, without some further argument against it.

So, let’s accept that moral language expresses propositions, that some of these propositions are true, and that they say something more about the external world than simply signifying a psychological state of the agent in question. My feeling is that most theists (Micael included) would be happy to agree with this, and that they would want to jump in and say that the external source is God. Micael writes that, for the theist, the metaphysical substance (and hence its ontological grounding) of objective moral values are the thoughts of God. Moral values are made of God’s thoughts, which explains how they can exist out there apart from us. However, this seems to be a strange and rather unhelpful answer. If Micael’s aim is to establish that a theistic ethic is objective – i.e. not depended on anyone’s thoughts about a given moral proposition – grounding them in God’s thoughts would seem to make them, at best, divinely subjective. But what we’re after, if we’re looking for an objective ethic, is a way to ground ethics apart from what everyone thinks – God included. We want the truth-maker of the theory in question not to be a subject – like you, me, or God – but rather an object. If Steve think that eating meat is wrong, and his way of grounding that is to refer back to himself – his preferences, his feelings, his thought that it just is so – we call that subjectivism. In the same way God is no different than Steve.

So, it seems that Micael might fall into the metaphysical subjectivism camp after all, which is what he was attempting to argue against. However, you might think that it doesn’t matter if it’s metaphysically objective (i.e. grounded in an object and not a subject – like God) as long as it’s epistemically objective (roughly meaning moral statements can be considered true or false when considered rationally and impartially), but on Micael’s view this also seems impossible. Consider again the moral proposition “it’s wrong to eat meat”. On Micael’s view, if this statement is true it’s true in virtue of God existing and – presumably – thinking, or at least him having the propositional attitude that meat eating is wrong. But that fact in and of itself lends no credence whatsoever to it actually being true that meat eating is in fact wrong, and that we ought not to eat meat. For that to be the case a further unstated premise in Micael’s argument would have to be true, namely that we ought to do what God thinks we ought to do. Without that we seem to be trying to get an ought (don’t eat meat) from an is (it is the case that God has a certain propositional attitude – in this case, the thought that meat eating is wrong). Micael can’t make his ethic objective without first adding the moral obligation to obey God’s command to his ontology. And that obligation must be assumed to be the case as an axiomatic ought, logically prior to all other moral statements – and I see no reason to accept it. Micael gives us no such reasons.

Furthermore, the framing of Micael’s entire essay is a bit of a false dichotomy: Ethics is either objective and therefore grounded in God, or – if God doesn’t exist and “naturalism” is true – objective ethics and the idea of moral knowledge is illusory. Either theism, or naturalism. But the meta-ethical divide looks nothing like this, as we have seen. Rather, there are many different, common views of various types: naturalism, non-naturalism, error-theory, emotivism, expressivism, subjectivism, convergentism – as well as divine command theory.4 So the idea that morality is somehow dependent upon God is just one view among many others, and a minority view at that. The problem with Micael’s text is that he seems to assume that there are only two meta-ethical positions (theism or naturalism), that the theistic position seemingly doesn’t need to be justified, and that the naturalistic position cannot be justified – neither of which is true.

Moral realism

So, Micael fail to establish that the theist has an advantage over the atheist in grounding an objective ethic, because he fails to show it’s even possible in a theistic framework. But, if God can’t ground moral judgement, what can? The reader might be disappointed to hear that I have no definitive answer to that question, but I’ll attempt to sketch two possible views.

Basically, when it comes to grounding objective moral values there are two main positions: either naturalism or non-naturalism. The naturalism construed here is not the general metaphysical view that “all that exist is natural”, but rather the meta-ethical view that moral statement express propositions that get their truth value from a natural fact – which means that moral properties are reducible to non-moral properties. Non-naturalists agree with naturalists that moral statements express propositions and that some of these propositions are true, but disagree that they can be reduced to the non-moral. Non-naturalists are therefore anti-reductionists, and construe moral values as sui generis: to say that “it’s immoral to eat meat”, while it might be explained by more basic moral principles, cannot be explained by a further non-moral fact of the world.

An inconvenient fact about Micael’s essay is that most theistic attempts to ground an objective moral theory – like Divine Command Theory – falls into the naturalistic category rather than the non-naturalist, since they try to reduce moral statements to a type of non-moral statement. Micael’s attempt to reduce moral propositions to God’s thoughts have that character as well (at least on the face of it). In the context of Micael’s text this is confusing since the entire premises of his essay is to construct a schism between the theist on the one hand, and the (albeit metaphysical) naturalist on the other – so it’s a bit troublesome that his own theory is a type of (ethical) naturalism. Making the distinction between metaphysical and meta-ethical naturalism elucidates that seeming contradiction, but since the entire discussion is about meta-ethics in the first place it’s needlessly confusing to construe the discussion in such a way. An objective theistic ethic of this type is a type of naturalism, albeit a super-naturalism – at least potentially so, because as we saw earlier, Micael’s theory is not even an objective theory of ethics.

But I digress. We have two possible ways of grounding an objective ethic: either moral propositions are reducible to some type of non-moral property, or they are true in virtue of some foundational or axiomatic moral fact. A version of the former I find plausible (though not wholly convincing) is some type of consequentialism based on wellbeing: the statement “it’s wrong to eat meat” then simply reduces to whether or not eating meat (and participating in and contributing to the meat industry) maximizes wellbeing – of everyone involved that can experience wellbeing and suffering – or not. The axiom this view requires us to accept is the idea that wellbeing is good and suffering is bad, which is open to a number of philosophical objection. But – unlike the axiom that we ought to obey God’s commands – the idea that suffering is bad is something that most (if not all) people accept. If not, ask them to put their hand on a hot stove and see how long they can keep it there.

Non-naturalism is more difficult to parse, but the idea is that goodness itself is a non-natural property (i.e. not reducible to natural facts) inherent in the world, perhaps similar to arithmetic or the laws of logic. The reductio of this view has long been to characterize it as implying that goodness exists “out there”, floating in some Platonic realm (see for example J. L. Mackie’s Argument From Queerness5). However, I think this is a mistaken way to construe the way normative facts might be said to “exist”. The ontological status of normative values as opposed to, say, chairs and tables simply is of a different type. Derek Parfit elucidates this view clearly in a single paragraph:

Though nothing could be truer than the truths of arithmetic, these truths have no ontological implications. I am a Non-Metaphysical Cognitivist about arithmetic, about normative truths, and several other areas of our thinking. Such truths involve entities and properties that have no ontological status. Numbers, for example, are neither real nor unreal, and neither actual nor merely possible. Even if nothing had ever existed, in the ontological sense, there would have been various truths, and abstract entities, in a non-ontological sense.6

So even if nothing had ever existed, it would still be true that 1+1=2 – even though there’d be no one around to do the calculation. This seems to me to be almost self-evident (though I know it clearly isn’t, since many philosophers disagree). Parfit’s view is that this also includes normative facts.

I leave it up to the reader to decide which version they find most plausible, if they in fact lean towards ethics being objective in the first place.

Now, I’ve clearly not given either of these two views justice, and the inquisitive reader would do well to stop reading this essay and start reading the contemporary philosophers arguing for these views instead of my truncated summaries. But, my point in mentioning these views is not to show them to be true, but simply to show that they both exist and are some of the main views in contemporary meta-ethics on the realist side. In fact, out of all the main meta-ethical views non-naturalism is probably the most well subscribed view of them all. And among ethicists around the world, 64% accept moral realism, and only 18% accept theism.7 Lest I be accused of making an argument from authority, I will hasten to add that this in and of itself isn’t an argument that either moral realism or atheism is true just because philosophers say so. What it does show, however, is that the idea that God doesn’t exist on the one hand, and that moral values are objective on the other, are not strange views to hold in tandem – in fact, it’s the most common view amongst experts.

As Micael concludes his remarks about the futility of trying to find normative facts that make no appeal to God he writes that “to my knowledge nothing of the kind has of yet been presented by naturalistic moral realists”. He must have missed most the discussion in 20th and 21st century meta-ethics on the subject. The only philosopher he decides to quote as an authority on the subject is Alasdair Macintyre. As Macintyre is well-known as one of the most prominent Catholics in contemporary philosophy, it’s unsurprising that Macintyre also thinks that all types of non-theistic moral realism fail.

Conclusion

I’ve attempted to show that Micael’s meta-ethical critique of the existence of objective moral facts in a universe without God is lacking. His attempt to turn the tables on the atheist to show that normative facts in a universe without God are impossible is unconvincing, because he neither shows what a meta-ethical ontology grounded in God would look like in a way that could retain its objectivity, nor does he prove that it’s impossible without reference to God – he merely stipulates that it is so. At the end of his essay he concludes:

I have argued that the naturalist first needs to justify the existence of an objective ethic in order to use the problem of evil as an argument against theism. This seems very difficult: personally, I wonder if it’s even possible.

I agree with Micael that justifying objective normative values is a difficult endeavor – no meta-ethical position is self-evident, without flaws or easy to argue for. But as I’ve attempted to show in this essay, it’s not easier for the theist – in fact, it seems even more difficult to imagine normative values retaining their objectivity while at the same time being depended on the existence of God. Personally, I wonder if it’s even possible.

I recently read Daniel Suhonen’s essay ​”Vad hade Erlander gjort?​” (Verbal, 2021. Literally transalted to “What Would Erlander Have Done?”), in which he briefly outlines a social democratic vision for Sweden. He draws parallels to Tage Erlander’s vision of Sweden and socialism during the 20th century, and it is a fairly accessible yet worthwhile piece. (Note: Tage Erlander was the Prime Minister of Sweden and leader of the Social Democratic Party from 1946 to 1969).

I agree with Suhonen on quite a few points, but what particularly caught my attention was his power analysis of what he calls the social democratic versus the moderate class coalition (i.e. the right-wing/conservative of the political spectrum in Sweden). According to Suhonen, the social democratic class coalition looks as follows:

A small, exploitative upper class is set against the broad mass of “ordinary people.” He contrasts this with the moderate class coalition:

The broad “insider” group (with a dominant middle class) is set against the socio-political bottom stratum – the low-income outsider group.

Suhonen himself writes that he presents “…a triangle representing social democracy’s strategy of uniting the working class and the popular majority at the base against the apex, which corresponds to the small elite that, in economic terms, may benefit from right-wing policies. In the other pyramid, the right-wing pyramid, the upper class is united with the middle class and the well-behaved segments of the working class. A horizontal line separates the upper three quarters of the triangle from its base.” (Suhonen, p. 74, translated from Swedish)

In other words, a fairly classical socialist class analysis. However, both analyses overlook the problematic elements present within their respective majority clusters. The Moderates’ “insider” group and the Social Democrats’ popular majority inevitably contain segments that exploit the welfare state; conversely, both the outsider group and the upper class also contain subsets that contribute significantly to society in one way or another.

This kind of simplification thus misses a more fundamental dividing line. One way to address this is instead to construct a class coalition rooted in Georgism:

This, it seems to me, is the fundamental line of division in society – one which, although very simple, does not lose anything essential, as it focuses on how income is generated rather than on socioeconomic status.

What does this mean in practice? To explain this, we first need to define the term “economic rent”, which is the income that arises from owning and controlling a resource. It is not about producing something, but rather about owning something that others need. Let me illustrate:

Imagine a group of pioneers traveling to a habitable planet to colonize it. They settle on a narrow strip of land surrounded by water. Everyone chooses different places to settle: one builds a house on a hill overlooking the water, some build down by the shore, someone closer to the forest, and one person – let us call him Sven – builds his house right in the middle of the narrow passage, thereby blocking access across.

It soon turns out to be highly advantageous to cross to the other side, where there are valuable natural resources – food that does not exist on the settled side, game to hunt, and various minerals to extract. The grass is literally greener on the other side, in this example. Unfortunately, the surrounding waters are filled with dangerous creatures, so crossing by water is not an option. As a result, all settlers must now pay Sven to pass back and forth, since society has allowed him to appropriate that piece of land. Depending on the value of the resources and how difficult alternative routes are, the toll he charges can be very high.

But Sven has not produced anything himself or created any value; he merely earns money by owning a valuable natural resource – in this case, a piece of land that provides access to other resources. What Sven extracts is economic rent.

This is, of course, not merely hypothetical. In reality we see, for example, how land prices in Stockholm have risen sharply over a long period, generating substantial profits for property owners without necessarily corresponding to increased productive effort. Similar patterns exist in the control of other natural resources, as well as in certain digital platforms that function as “virtual land.” This phenomenon is therefore not limited to physical land.

The rentier class, then, is the class that lives primarily off economic rent rather than producing value. As the illustration above shows, it cuts across all social classes, though it is particularly concentrated in the upper strata. Nor is it a clear-cut division, since many people derive income from a mix of labor, capital, and economic rent – myself included, as I own the land on which my house stands.

The largest form of economic rent is land ownership. The simplest way to address this injustice and create a more equitable system of redistribution would be to socialize rent through the introduction of a land value tax – that is, to tax the value that arises collectively. Such a tax would not apply to what has been produced, such as buildings, but only to the land itself. It is fundamentally just, since it targets value created by society as a whole, making it reasonable that this value should also return to the collective, in the form of public welfare. Unlike other taxes, a land value tax is also non-distortionary, since the market cannot respond by producing less land; the supply of land is fixed.

Introducing such a tax would increase government revenue from the rentier class while allowing taxes on the productive class to be minimized, for instance through lower income taxes. We would thus stop taxing those who contribute to society – through work and production – and instead tax those who primarily extract income from society without corresponding production – through ownership of natural resources. According to the principle that you get less of what you tax, this would reduce rent-seeking behavior and increase productive activity.

As far as I know, there is unfortunately no evidence that Tage Erlander supported a land value tax during his time in power. At the time, the Social Democrats assessed that such a policy lacked popular support and was opposed, among others, by the agrarian class, and they therefore chose a different path. In recent years, however, a number of commentators from across the political spectrum in Sweden have once again begun to flirt with the idea.1 Even LO (The Swedish Trade Union Confederation) recently published a report in which a land value tax was viewed favorably.

I believe it is once again time for the Social Democrats to reconsider this idea with fresh eyes – and to seriously take a step toward a more just economy.

Perhaps Suhonen could lead the way here as well?

Jag läste nyligen Daniel Suhonens essä ​”Vad hade Erlander gjort?​” (Verbal, 2021), där han kortfattat formulerar en socialdemokratisk vision för Sverige. Han drar paralleller med Tage Erlanders vision om Sverige och socialismen under 1900-talet, och det är en ganska lättläst men ändå läsvärd skrift.

Jag håller med Suhonen om en hel del av vad han skriver, men något jag fastnade extra vid var hans maktanalys av vad han kallar den socialdemokratiska vs. den moderata klasskoalitionen. Enligt Suhonen ser den socialdemokratiska klasskoalitionen ut på följande sätt:

En liten exploaterande överklass ställs mot den breda massan av “vanligt folk”. Han kontrasterar det mot den moderata klasskoalitionen:

Det breda innanförskapet (med en dominerande medelklass) ställs mot det sociopolitiska bottenskiktet, det låginkomsttagande utanförskapet.

Suhonen själv skriver att han visar ”…[e]n triangel för socialdemokratins stra­tegi att förena arbetarklassen och småfolksmajoriteten i basen mot spetsen som mot­svarar den lilla elit som i ekonomiska termer möjligtvis vinner på högerpolitik. I den andra pyramiden, högerpyramiden, förenas överheten med medelklassen och ar­betarklassens skötsamma skikt. Ett horison­tellt streck avskiljer de övre tre fjärdedelarna av triangeln från dess bas.” (Suhonen, s. 74)

En relativt klassisk socialistisk klassanalys, med andra ord. Men båda analyserna missar de problematiska element som finns i respektive majoritetskluster. Moderaternas innanförskap och Socialdemokraternas småfolksmajoritet innehåller ofrånkomligen ett skikt som utnyttjar välfärdssamhället, och omvänt innehåller utanförskapet och överklassen en delmängd som bidrar en hel del till samhället på ett eller annat sätt.

Den grova förenklingen missar således en mer fundamental skiljelinje. Ett sätt att adressera detta är att i stället skapa en klasskoalition som tar avstamp i georgismen:

Detta förefaller mig vara den grundläggande gränsdragningen i samhället, som – även om den är mycket enkel – inte tappar något väsentligt, då den fokuserar på hur inkomster uppstår snarare än på socioekonomisk status.

Vad innebär detta då i praktiken? För att förklara det behöver vi först definiera termen “ekonomisk ränta” (engelskans rent), vilket inte bör förväxlas med det vi på svenska kort och gott brukar kalla ”ränta” – alltså exempelvis låneränta eller kapitalränta.

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Ekonomisk ränta är den inkomst som uppstår genom att äga och kontrollera en resurs. Det handlar alltså inte om att producera något, utan enbart om att äga något som andra behöver. Låt mig illustrera:

Tänk dig att en grupp pionjärer reser till en beboelig planet för att kolonisera den. De slår sig ner vid ett näs, alltså ett smalt landområde omgivet av vatten. Alla väljer ut olika platser att bosätta sig på: någon bygger ett hus på en kulle som blickar ut över vattnet, några bygger nere vid stranden, någon närmare skogen, och en person – låt oss kalla honom Sven – bygger sitt hus precis i mitten av det smala landområdet, vilket blockerar passagen över näset till andra sidan.

Det visar sig ganska snabbt vara fördelaktigt att ta sig över näset, då det på andra sidan finns en mängd viktiga naturresurser att hämta där – det växer mat som saknas på den bosatta sidan, vilt att jaga, och diverse mineraler att utvinna. Gräset är bokstavligen grönare på andra sidan, i detta exempel. Tyvärr är dessutom vattnet på denna planet fyllt med ett antal livsfarliga varelser, så att ge sig ut över vattnet är inte ett alternativ. För att nu ta del av naturresurserna på andra sidan måste alltså alla bosättare betala Sven för att ta sig över och tillbaka, eftersom samhället har tillåtit honom att appropriera den biten av mark. Beroende på hur värdefulla resurserna är på andra sidan, och hur krångligt det är att ta en annan väg, kan tullavgiften Sven begär vara väldigt hög.

Men Sven har inte själv producerat något eller skapat något av värde, han tjänar enbart pengar på att han äger en värdefull naturresurs, i detta fall en bit mark som i sin tur öppnar upp vägen till andra naturresurser. Det Sven tar ut är ekonomisk ränta.

Detta är förstås inte enbart hypotetiskt, i verkligheten ser vi exempelvis hur markpriserna i Stockholm har stigit kraftigt under lång tid, vilket har genererat stora vinster för fastighetsägare utan att dessa nödvändigtvis motsvaras av ökad produktiv insats. Liknande mönster finns i kontrollen över andra naturresurser, liksom i vissa digitala plattformar som fungerar som “virtuell mark”. Det gäller alltså inte enbart fysisk mark.

Rentierklassen är således den klass som lever på ekonomisk ränta snarare än på att producera värde. Och som illustrationen ovan visar skär den genom alla samhällsklasser, men är särskilt koncentrerad i de övre samhällsskikten. Det är inte heller en svartvit skiljelinje, då väldigt många har inkomster både från arbete, kapital och från ekonomisk ränta – jag själv inkluderad, eftersom jag äger marken mitt hus står på.

Den allra största formen av ekonomisk ränta är just markägande. Det enklaste sättet att adressera den orättvisan och skapa en mer jämlik omfördelningspolitik vore att socialisera räntan genom införandet av en markvärdesskatt, och alltså beskatta det värde som uppstår kollektivt. Skatten skulle alltså inte ligga på sådant som producerats, så som byggnader, utan enbart på själva marken. Den är fundamentalt rättvis eftersom det är en skatt som faller på ett värde som skapats gemensamt, vilket därmed gör det rimligt att värdet också skulle återgå till det gemensamma, det vill säga välfärden. Till skillnad från andra skatter är markvärdesskatt heller inte snedvridande av ekonomin, eftersom marknaden inte kan svara på skatten genom att producera mindre mark; mängden mark som existerar är fast.

Införandet av en sådan skatt skulle höja statens intäkter från rentierklassen, och man skulle då kunna minimera skatten för den produktiva klassen, bland annat genom sänkt inkomstskatt. Vi skulle då sluta beskatta de som bidrar till samhället – via arbete och produktion – och börja beskatta de som huvudsakligen tar inkomster från samhället utan motsvarande produktion – via ägande av naturresurser. Enligt devisen att man får mindre av vad man beskattar kommer vi således minska räntesökandet och öka arbetet.

Tyvärr finns det så vitt jag vet inga källor som talar för att Tage Erlander var för markvärdesskatt under sin tid vid makten. Socialdemokraterna gjorde vid den tiden analysen att den policyn hade lågt folkligt stöd och motsattes bland annat av bondeklassen, och valde därmed en annan väg. På senare tid har dock ett antal debattörer från olika delar av den politiska skalan återigen börjat flörta med idén.1 Även LO gav nyligen ut en rapport där markvärdeskatt nämndes med favör.

Jag anser att det återigen är dags för Socialdemokraterna att undersöka idén med nya ögon, och därmed på allvar ta steget i riktningen mot en mer rättvis ekonomi.

Kanske kan Suhonen gå i bräschen även här?

All varieties of what is vaguely called socialism recognize with more or less clearness the solidarity of the interests of the masses of all countries. Whatever may be objected to socialism in its extremest forms, it has at least the merit of lessening national prejudices and aiming at the disbandment of armies and the suppression of war. It is thus opposed to the cardinal tenet of protectionism that the interests of the people of different ”nations” are diverse and antagonistic. But, on the other hand, those who call themselves socialists, so far from being disposed to look with disfavor upon governmental interference and regulation, are disposed to sympathize with protection as in this respect in harmony with socialism, and to regard free trade, at least as it has been popularly presented, as involving a reliance on that principle of free competition which to their thinking means the crushing of the weak.

Let us endeavor, as well as can in brief be done, to trace the relations between the conclusions to which we have come and what, with various shades of meaning, is termed ”socialism.”

In socialism as distinguished from individualism there is an unquestionable truth—and that a truth to which (especially by those most identified with freetrade principles) too little attention has been paid. Man is primarily an individual—a separate entity, differing from his fellows in desires and powers, and requiring for the exercise of those powers and the gratification of those desires individual play and freedom. But he is also a social being, having desires that harmonize with those of his fellows, and powers that can only be brought out in concerted action. There is thus a domain of individual action and a domain of social action—some things which can best be done when each acts for himself, and some things which can best be done when society acts for all its members. And the natural tendency of advancing civilization is to make social conditions relatively more important, and more and more to enlarge the domain of social action. This has not been sufficiently regarded, and at the present time, evil unquestionably results from leaving to individual action functions that by reason of the growth of society and the development of the arts have passed into the domain of social action; just as on the other hand, evil unquestionably results from social interference with what properly belongs to the individual. Society ought not to leave the telegraph and the railway to the management and control of individuals; nor yet ought society to step in and collect individual debts or attempt to direct individual industry.

But while there is a truth in socialism which individualists forget, there is a school of socialists who in like manner ignore the truth there is in individualism, and whose propositions for the improvement of social conditions belong to the class I have called ”super-adequate.” Socialism in its narrow sense—the socialism that would have the State absorb capital and abolish competition—is the scheme of men who, looking upon society in its most complex organization, have failed to see that principles obvious in a simpler stage still hold true in the more intimate relations that result from the division of labor and the use of complex tools and methods, and have thus fallen into fallacies elaborated by the economists of a totally different school, who have taught that capital is the employer and sustainer of labor, and have striven to confuse the distinction between property in land and property in labor-products. Their scheme is that of men who, while revolting from the heartlessness and hopelessness of the ”orthodox political economy,” are yet entangled in its fallacies and blinded by its confusions. Confounding ”capital” with ”means of production,” and accepting the dictum that ”natural wages” are the least on which competition can force the laborer to live, they essay to cut a knot they do not see how to unravel, by making the State the sole capitalist and employer, and abolishing competition.

The carrying on by government of all production and exchange, as a remedy for the difficulty of finding employment on the one side, and for overgrown fortunes on the other, belongs to the same category as the prescription that all men should be good. That if all men were assigned proper employment and all wealth fairly distributed, then none would need employment and there would be no injustice in distribution, is as indisputable a proposition as that if all were good none would be bad. But it will not help a man perplexed as to his path to tell him that the way to get to his journey’s end is to get there.

That all men should be good is the greatest desideratum, but it can only be secured by the abolition of conditions which tempt some and drive others into evil doing. That each should render according to his abilities and receive according to his needs, is indeed the very highest social state of which we can conceive, but how shall we hope to attain such perfection until we can first find some way of securing to every man the opportunity to labor and the fair earnings of his labor. Shall we try to be generous before we have learned how to be just?

All schemes for securing equality in the conditions of men by placing the distribution of wealth in the hands of government have the fatal defect of beginning at the wrong end. They pre-suppose pure government; but it is not government that makes society; it is society that makes government; and until there is something like substantial equality in the distribution of wealth, we cannot expect pure government.

But to put all men on a footing of substantial equality, so that there could be no dearth of employment, no ”over-production,” no tendency of wages to the minimum of subsistence, no monstrous fortunes on the one side and no army of proletarians on the other, it is not necessary that the state should assume the ownership of all the means of production and become the general employer and universal exchanger; it is necessary only that the equal rights of all to that primary means of production which is the source all other means of production are derived from, should be asserted. And this, so far from involving an extension of governmental functions and machinery, involves, as we have seen, their great reduction. It would thus tend to purify government in two ways—first by the betterment of the social conditions on which purity in government depends, and second, by the simplification of administration. This step taken, and we could safely begin to add to the functions of the state in its proper or co-operative sphere.

There is in reality no conflict between labor and capital; the true conflict is between labor and monopoly. That a rich employer ”squeezes” needy workmen may be true. But does this squeezing power result from his riches or from their need? No matter how rich an employer might be, how would it be possible for him to squeeze workmen who could make a good living for themselves without going into his employment? The competition of workmen with workmen for employment, which is the real cause that enables, and even in most cases forces, the employer to squeeze his workmen, arises from the fact that men, debarred of the natural opportunities to employ themselves, are compelled to bid against one another for the wages of an employer. Abolish the monopoly that forbids men to employ themselves, and capital could not possibly oppress labor. In no case could the capitalist obtain labor for less than the laborer could get by employing himself. Once remove the cause of that injustice which deprives the laborer of the capital his toil creates, and the sharp distinction between capitalist and laborer would, in fact, cease to exist.

They who, seeing how men are forced by competition to the extreme of human wretchedness, jump to the conclusion that competition should be abolished, are like those who, seeing a house burn down, would prohibit the use of fire.

The air we breathe exerts upon every square inch of our bodies a pressure of fifteen pounds. Were this pressure exerted only on one side, it would pin us to the ground and crush us to a jelly. But being exerted on all sides, we move under it with perfect freedom. It not only does not inconvenience us, but it serves such indispensable purposes that, relieved of its pressure, we should die.

So it is with competition. Where there exists a class denied all right to the element necessary to life and labor, competition is one-sided, and as population increases must press the lowest class into virtual slavery, and even starvation. But where the natural rights of all are secured, then competition, acting on every hand—between employers as between employed; between buyers as between sellers—can injure no one. On the contrary it becomes the most simple, most extensive, most elastic, and most refined system of co-operation, that, in the present stage of social development, and in the domain where it will freely act, we can rely on for the co-ordination of industry and the economizing of social forces.

In short, competition plays just such a part in the social organism as those vital impulses which are beneath consciousness do in the bodily organism. With it, as with them, it is only necessary that it should be free. The line at which the state should come in is that where free competition becomes impossible—a line analogous to that which in the individual organism separates the conscious from the unconscious functions. There is such a line, though extreme socialists and extreme individualists both ignore it. The extreme individualist is like the man who would have his hunger provide him food; the extreme socialist is like the man who would have his conscious will direct his stomach how to digest it.

Individualism and socialism are in truth not antagonistic but correlative. Where the domain of the one principle ends that of the other begins. And although the motto Laissez faire has been taken as the watch word of an individualism that tends to anarchism, and so-called free traders have made “the law of supply and demand” a stench in the nostrils of men alive to social injustice, there is in free trade nothing that conflicts with a rational socialism. On the contrary, we have but to carry out the free trade principle to its logical conclusions to see that it brings us to such socialism.

The free-trade principle is, as we have seen, the principle of free production—it requires not merely the abolition of protective tariffs, but the removal of all restrictions upon production.

Within recent years a class of restrictions on production, imposed by concentrations and combinations which have for their purpose the limiting of production and the increase of prices, have begun to make themselves felt and to assume greater and greater importance.

This power of combinations to restrict production arises in some cases from temporary monopolies granted by our patent laws, which (being the premium that society holds out to invention), have a compensatory principle, however faulty they may be in method.

Such cases aside, this power of restricting production is derived, in part, from tariff restrictions. Thus the American steel makers who have recently limited their production, and put up the price of rails 40 per cent. at one stroke, are enabled to do this only by the heavy duty on imported rails. They are able, by combination, to put up the price of steel rails to the point at which they could be imported plus the duty, but no further. Hence, with the abolition of the duty this power would be gone. To prevent the play of competition, a combination of the steel workers of the whole world would then be necessary, and this is practically impossible.

In other part, this restrictive power arises from ability to monopolize natural advantages. This would be destroyed if the taxation of land values made it unprofitable to hold land without using it. In still other part, it arises from the control of businesses which in their nature do not admit of competition, such as those of railway, telegraph, gas, and other similar companies.

I read in the daily papers that half a dozen representatives of the ”anthracite coal interest” met last evening (March 24, 1886), in an office in New York. Their conference, interrupted only by a collation, lasted till three o’clock in the morning. When they separated they had come to ”an understanding among gentlemen” to restrict the production of anthracite coal and advance its price.

Now how comes it that half a dozen men, sitting around some bottles of champagne and a box of cigars in a New York office, can by an ”understanding among gentlemen” compel Pennsylvania miners to stand idle, and advance the price of coal along the whole eastern seaboard? The power thus exercised is derived in various parts from three sources.

1. From the protective duty on coal. Free trade would abolish that.

2. From the power to monopolize land, which enables them to prevent others from using coal deposits which they will not use themselves. True free trade, as we have seen, would abolish that.

3. From the control of railways, and the consequent power of fixing rates and making discriminations in transportation.

The power of fixing rates of transportation, and in this way of discriminating against persons and places, is a power essentially of the same nature as that exercised by governments in levying import duties. And the principle of free trade as clearly requires the removal of such restrictions as it requires the removal of import duties. But here we reach a point where positive action on the part of government is needed. Except as between terminal or ”competitive” points where two or more roads meet (and as to these the tendency is, by combination or ”pooling,” to do away with competition), the carrying of goods and passengers by rail, like the business of telegraph, telephone, gas, water, or similar companies, is in its nature a monopoly. To prevent restrictions and discriminations, governmental control is therefore required. Such control is not only not inconsistent with the free-trade principle; it follows from it, just as the interference of government to prevent and punish assaults upon persons and property follows from the principle of individual liberty. Thus, if we carry free trade to its logical conclusions we are inevitably led to what monopolists, who wish to be ”let alone” to plunder the public, denounce as ”socialism,” and which is, indeed, socialism, in the sense that it recognizes the true domain of social functions.

Whether businesses in their nature monopolies should be regulated by law or should be carried on by the community, is a question of method. It seems to me, however, that experience goes to show that better results can be secured, with less risk of governmental corruption, by state management than by state regulation. But the great simplification of government which would result from the abolition of the present complex and demoralizing modes of taxation would vastly increase the ease and safety with which either of these methods could be applied. The assumption by the state of all those social functions in which competition will not operate would involve nothing like the strain upon governmental powers, and would be nothing like as provocative of corruption and dishonesty, as our present method of collecting taxes. The more equal distribution of wealth that would ensue from the reform which thus simplified government, would, moreover, increase public intelligence and purify public morals, and enable us to bring a higher standard of honesty and ability to the management of public affairs. We have no right to assume that men would be as grasping and dishonest in a social state where the poorest could get an abundant living as they are in the present social state, where the fear of poverty begets insane greed.

There is another way, moreover, in which true free trade tends strongly to socialism, in the highest and best sense of the term. The taking for the use of the community of that value of privilege which attaches to the possession of land, would, wherever social development has advanced beyond a certain stage, yield revenues even larger than those now raised by taxation, while there would be an enormous reduction in public expenses consequent, directly and indirectly, upon the abolition of present modes of taxation. Thus would be provided a fund, increasing steadily with social growth, that could be applied to social purposes now neglected. And among the purposes which will suggest themselves to the reader by which the surplus income of the community could be used to increase the sum of human knowledge, the diffusion of elevating tastes, and the gratification of healthy desires, there is none more worthy than that of making honorable provision for those deprived of their natural protectors, of through no fault of their own incapacitated for the struggle of life.

We should think it sin and shame if a great steamer, dashing across the ocean, were not brought to a stop by a signal of distress from the meanest smack; at the sight of an infant lashed to a spar, the mighty ship would round to, and men would spring to launch a boat in angry seas. Thus strongly does the bond of our common humanity appeal to us when we get beyond the hum of civilized life. And yet—a miner is entombed alive, a painter falls from a scaffold, a brakeman is crushed in coupling cars, a merchant fails, falls ill and dies, and organized society leaves widow and children to bitter want or degrading alms. This ought not to be. Citizenship in a civilized community ought of itself to be insurance against such a fate. And having in mind that the income which the community ought to obtain from the land to which the growth of the community gives value is in reality not a tax but the proceeds of a just rent, an English Democrat (William Saunders, M. P.) puts in this phrase the aim of true free trade: ”No taxes at all, and a pension to everybody.”

This is denounced as ”the rankest socialism” by those whose notion of the fitness of things is, that the descendants of royal favorites and blue-blooded thieves should be kept in luxurious idleness all their lives long, by pensions wrung from struggling industry, while the laborer and his wife, worn out by hard work, for which they have received scarce living wages, are degraded by a parish dole, or separated from each other in a ”work-house.”

If this is socialism, then, indeed, is it true that free trade leads to socialism.

Removing the Commons

Eric Roark (2013)

The best introduction to the left-libertarian concept of justice I’ve read. Roark defends a georgist interpretation of the Lockean Proviso, in which those who remove natural resources from the commons must pay the competitive rent of their removal in a way that best promotes equal opportunity for welfare. He writes clearly and accessibly, even though the book gets quite technical at times, and he often illustrates his points with analogies that make them easier to follow. The only downside is that he has a tendency to repeat himself, which can get a bit tedious.

Urban Land Rent: Singapore as a Property State

Anne Haila (2015)

A deep dive into the economic system of Singapore, which in many respects is close to georgist (though in some ways it is not, as 90% of the land is nationalized). It’s very thorough, covering different views of land ownership underpinned by various philosophers, the history of the region, as well as modern-day economic life in Singapore. If you’re really interested in learning how land reform could – and actually does – work in different parts of the world, this is very instructive. It’s not for the casual reader, though.

Land: A New Paradigm for a Thriving World

Martin Adams (2015)

A shorter introduction to georgism, which isn’t as technical as most other books and is therefore more accessible. This might be a good starting point for someone who isn’t very good at or interested in economics, or for someone coming more from the political left and/or an environmentalist perspective.

Rent Unmasked

Fred Harrison et al. (2016)

A collection of essays by different writers (written in honour of the late Mason Gaffney). My favourite essay is “Beyond Socialism: Science and the Culture of Society” by Fred Harrison, which details how a group of Western academics tried to persuade the Soviet Union not to let land rent fall into private hands as it moved away from socialism. Many of the essays in the book were a bit too technical for me, though.

Land Is a Big Deal

Lars Doucet (2022)

If you go to the georgism subreddit and ask for a book recommendation, besides Henry George this is the one everyone will tell you to read – and for good reason. It’s probably the best, most accessible, and at the same time most thorough book on modern georgism you’ll find. It starts as a review and summary of Progress and Poverty, moves on to address some of the main criticisms of georgism (such as “Is land really a big deal?” and “Won’t the LVT just get passed on?”), and ends with proposals for what needs to be done. I interviewed Lars for my podcast a while back; that conversation can be listened to here.

Land and Liberty

Christopher William England (2023)

A history of georgism, focused mainly on the movement itself starting with Henry George, and how it shaped American politics in particular (with a few minor detours). I would’ve loved a broader perspective – more “geoist” than “georgist”, so to speak – as I’m not that interested in the finer details of 20th-century American electoral politics. If you’re very nerdy and interested in American politics and georgism, though, this book will be right up your alley.

Technofeudalism

Yanis Varoufakis (2023)

Even though Varoufakis is a libertarian socialist and Marxist, his analysis of the current political landscape is valuable from a georgist perspective. He explains how Big Tech has managed to bypass traditional markets and establish a digital fiefdom to extract “cloud rent”. As modern-day georgists aren’t just critical of private ownership of land, but of all land-like assets that can be used to extract unearned rent, this is perhaps the most important conversation that needs to be had in the coming years (besides the land question – but they are two sides of the same coin).

Land & Liberty

Martin Jacobson (2024)

This PhD thesis by Jacobson explores the relationship between georgism and anarchism, which he argues have a symbiotic relationship: the anarchist rejection of the state can be extended to a rejection of land ownership, while the georgist rejection of land ownership can be extended to a rejection of state authority. If you’re interested in georgism and anarchism (aka geo-anarchism), this is obviously for you – but be aware that the language is quite philosophically technical. It is a thesis, after all. I interviewed Martin (in Swedish) for my podcast a while back; that conversation can be listened to here.

The Land Trap

Mike Bird (2025)

Even though Mike Bird isn’t explicitly a georgist, he certainly writes like one. In The Land Trap, he argues that land is one of the main economic driving forces throughout history, that it is “the world’s oldest and most important asset”, and that it underpins everything from wars and revolutions to the global financial system. A must-read for georgists and non-georgists alike.

Land Power

Michael Albertus (2025)

In a sense, this is somewhat similar to The Land Trap, although instead of approaching land primarily from an economic perspective, this book does so from a political one. Albertus shows that who owns land determines who has political power, and how control over land has shaped everything from equality – between the sexes, ethnicities, or classes – to the environmental crisis.

If you have any suggested reading (especially of books that lean into the political philosophy side) I very much appreciate it, so drop it in the comments.

I’ll divide this post into two parts and list the books according to their publication date. These are just the books I’ve read so far, which means a few kind of “obvious” ones (like Protection and Free Trade by Henry George) are missing, simply because I’ve yet to read them. As I read more, I’ll do a Part III.

Not all books on the list are explicitly georgist, but all are – I think – worth reading as a georgist or from a georgist perspective. As I read more, I might even start including some books that are explicitly anti-georgist, because obviously it’s important to read criticism of your own position as well.

The Real Rights of Man

Thomas Spence (1775)

A short lecture given by the English radical Thomas Spence advocating common ownership of land. Highly readable, even though the English is a bit archaic. Spence was an early proponent of women’s rights, the rights of children, and UBI – an impressive person who really deserves to be better known in the history of radicals.

Agrarian Justice

Thomas Paine (1797)

A pamphlet written by Thomas Paine arguing for the capture of ground rent as a means to fund pensions as well as a fixed sum to be handed out to everyone when they reach the age of maturity. Like the previous entry, this is very short and therefore an easy read, even if the language can be a bit difficult if English isn’t your first language (as is the case for me).

The Rights of Infants

Thomas Spence (1797)

Another short text by Spence, reacting to Paine’s Agrarian Justice, which he felt wasn’t radical enough. Did I mention what a bad-ass Spence was? Written as a dialogue between “the aristocracy” and a woman, it’s not just a great example of early radical land reform, but also of feminism.

Progress and Poverty

Henry George (1879)

This is sort of an obvious read if you’re interested in georgism, written by the man who gave georgism its name: Henry George. In it, he tries to identify how it’s possible that nations all around the world are progressively getting richer and richer, and yet poverty doesn’t seem to be declining (in fact, in some ways industrialization makes poverty worse). George’s diagnosis – the private ownership of land – and his remedy – a tax on the full value of land – were the start of an entire movement. Even though it can get a bit repetitive, it’s still written in quite plain language, which makes it surprisingly accessible.

Social Problems

Henry George (1883)

A shorter book of essays by George – if you don’t feel ready to tackle Progress and Poverty yet, this could be a good place to start. I suppose you could say that if Progress and Poverty is George’s Das Kapital, this is his Communist Manifesto.

How Much Land Does a Man Need?

Leo Tolstoy (1886)

Besides being a Christian pacifist and anarchist, Tolstoy was an ardent georgist at the end of his life. His novel Resurrection (which I’ve yet to read) is explicitly georgist, but this short novella tackles related topics such as the desire to acquire more and more land and the downfalls that come from greed. Just a piece of great classical fiction, and a nice respite from reading so much economics and political philosophy.

Democracy versus Socialism

Max Hirsch (1901)

This might be one of my favorite books on early georgism that isn’t by George himself. Written by the Australian economist Max Hirsch, the first part is an extensive critique of socialism, in which he quotes extensively from socialists of his time (including Marx) to make his points. He ends with his own political solution: the single tax on land.

Jordvärdebeskattning i stället för rusdrycksbeskattning

Johan Hansson (1906)

Another impressive person who deserves to be better known. Hansson was an ardent critic of Nazi Germany, a vegetarian, and a publisher who founded one of Sweden’s largest publishing houses, Natur & Kultur (which still exists) – as well as a georgist. This roughly 25-page pamphlet argues against the liquor tax in Sweden at the time, which he believed made the government dependent on people consuming alcohol to fund the state. To replace it, he instead argued for a tax on land.

The Essence of Progress and Poverty

Henry George, John Dewey (1928)

If you’re not sure you want to commit to reading Progress and Poverty in its entirety, this abridged version might be for you. Even if you skip this one, the short preface written by the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey is worth reading in its own right.

The Corruption of Economics

Mason Gaffney and Fred Harrison (1994)

If georgism is so great, how come no one knows about it, and why isn’t it taught – or even mentioned – in economics classes? That’s what this book attempts to answer, by documenting the ways in which George was actively suppressed and downplayed by neoclassical economics in the 20th century. I found it a bit of a chore to read, but it’s important nonetheless.

The Origins of Left-Libertarianism & Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics

Peter Vallentyne et al. (2000)

I came to georgism via political philosophy, and more specifically through reading about left-libertarianism, which georgism could be construed as a subset of. I haven’t read every single essay in both anthologies (I’ve only skimmed them, to be honest), but there’s a lot of interesting material here if you’re into political philosophy.

In the first book, Henry George has a chapter, as do John Locke, Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, and Léon Walras. Agrarian Justice by Paine and The Real Rights of Man by Spence are also included in their entirety. The second book features contemporary debates, with many interesting contributors such as Michael Otsuka, Peter Vallentyne, and Philippe van Parijs.

This is the first part of at least two, but I’m hoping to keep reading more on this subject. If you have any suggested reading (especially of books that lean into the political philosophy side) I very much appreciate it, so drop it in the comments.